This piece is from one of our monitors in the Northern part of Sierra Leone. It tells a story of one Saffie Koroma, a young mother, who was maliciously prosecuted on trump up indictments by the police for allegedly murdering her son. The reason behind this publication is twofold: on the one hand, it gives a prelude to the thousands of untold stories of injustices meted out by the police in performing their statutory duty of maintaining law and order. On the other, it helps bring to the fore, for the attention of the public, the myriad challenges faced by thousands of our less fortunate compatriots who can hardly access justice primarily because of their social conditions.
Saffie has lived most of her life in Tonkolili and speaks only Themne her native language. She does not speak even the unofficial lingua franca, Krio, let alone read or write English, the official language of the court. Her knowledge about human rights and the rule of law is very limited, if any; her knowledge about the world does not stretch beyond her immediate environment. In the morning of December 19 2005, Saffie was arraigned before the Magistrate Court in Magburuka, the district headquarter town of Tonkolili on a murder charge contrary to law. As a background to this case, Safie’s son was discovered dead with his right eye gorged out and his tongue cut off- apparently indications of a ritual murder.
While in court, Saffie stood dumb as the charge was being read out to her by the court clerk. After the charge had been read, she entered a plea of not guilty. It was the exercise of that right that opened a floodgate of her debilitating ordeal. She was refused bail without good reason and was remanded in custody, whilst incessantly appearing in court. She had no legal counsel which was a violation of her right as provided for in sec. 28(5)(a&b) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991; and her case frequently frivolously adjourned for very long periods, almost becoming a routine procedure for about two years ten months in detention, contrary to sec. 23(1) of same. She was finally acquitted and discharged on October 10, 2008 for lack of sufficient evidence to prosecute the case. During the acquittal, the presiding Judge Justice Alusine Sesay lambasted the police for its ineptitude and lack of thoroughness in carrying out the investigation in the said case.
Saffie’s ordeal started right from the time of her arrest- her rights were never adhered to as provided for under sec. 22(5) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991. Furthermore, she was kept in detention in police cell for more than three weeks before her first appearance in the Magistrate Court in Magburaka for preliminary investigation contrary to sec. 17(3)a of same which states that “any person who is arrested or detained…shall be brought before the court of law within ten days from the date of arrest in case of capital offences, offences carrying life imprisonment and economic and environmental offences”, The Criminal Procedure Act of 1965, sec. 10 also reinforces this provision; stating thus: “subject to the provisions of section 80, all arrested persons shall be brought as soon as possible before the court having jurisdiction in the case or the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such person was arrested.”
Also, Saffie’s detention for more than ten days before any charge was brought against her in court was an outright violation of her rights under the law. As an accused person, the laws provide that she must be brought under a judicial control without undue delay and her rights must be protected therein which include the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. After her initial charge in the magistrate’s court for Preliminary Investigation, it took twelve months before the matter was committed to the appropriate court (High Court) with jurisdiction to hear the matter. During the Preliminary Investigations, key prosecution witnesses were frequently absent and the Court was not forthcoming in throwing the matter out of court for want of prosecution witnesses to testify in the matter. Hardly, if any, bench warrant was served on the witnesses for the sake of expeditiousness. Although the CPA has no time limit on Preliminary Investigations, section 113 (3) of the Act underscores the importance of an expeditious process. It provides that where a Magistrate who starts a Preliminary Investigation is for any reason unable to continue the process, it shall not be necessary for his successor to re-commence such investigation except were the succeeding Magistrate thinks that the matter can be adjudicated by himself.
For a Preliminary Investigation to take up to one year was not only a breach of the accused’s right to liberty and security of persons as she was kept in detention whilst her matter was continually been adjourned, but it also violated her right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial articulated in Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Even a thorough Preliminary Investigation to obtain evidence that is substantial enough to try her will not require a whole year and therefore will not justify the one year delay, especially when the prosecutors and their witnesses often did not show up. The Human Rights Committee was very clear on this when in its Communication in the case N. Fillastre v. Bolivia noted that “… investigation into a criminal case, [even if] in their essence, is carried out by way of a written proceeding” does not justify such delays. [i]
When the case was finally committed to the High Court, Saffie could not contract the service of a lawyer because of lack of money. The state also failed to provide her one. Consequently, she was left at the mercy of a court that is fraught with administrative or logistic problems. Her matter was worsened by the language difficulty. Saffie could not understand any other language except Themne, her native language. As a result, her case was frequently adjourned for the lack of an interpreter. The court’s interpreter had ceased to go to court because of lack of payment for services rendered.
The right to an interpreter is a fundamental right to fair trial and particularly important in Saffie’s case as she cannot speak any other language except Themne. In fact it was indispensable in the matter under consideration because of the seriousness of the said case. It is very essential for the accused to be able to follow or understand the proceedings especially in situations like the instant case in which the accused conviction may lead to a life sentence or death penalty. While it was correct for the matter to be adjourned because of the absence of an interpreter; the frequent adjournment of the matter as result of a lack of an interpreter prolonged the case and Saffie’s agony in detention.
In addition to the absence of an interpreter and the lack of legal representation, the prosecution also often came to court unprepared. Furthermore, its witnesses either showed up late or did not show up at all. The prosecution therefore frequently asked for adjournments of the trial on grounds of absence of prosecution witnesses or the non-preparedness of the prosecution. With no defence counsel to raise an objection, Safie was left at the mercy of God and the bench.
However, things took a positive turn when a paralegal group, Timap for Justice, decided to provide legal aid for the accused. Once Saffie had a legal representation, her matter was no longer adjourned unnecessarily and subsequently regained her liberty and freedom on the 10 October 2008, after a no case submission had been made by the defence.
What is worth commenting about is the length the trial took- an alarming two years plus! It contravenes both domestic and international human rights laws which provides for the trial of an accused person “without undue delay” or “within a reasonable time” [ii] . This provision is important as it “ is not only designed to avoid keeping persons too long in a state of uncertainty about their fate and, if held in detention during the period of the trial, to ensure that such deprivation of liberty does not last longer than necessary in the circumstances of the specific case, but also to serve the interests of justice.” [iii] The Human Rights Committee in its general Comment No. 13 provided an explanation of “without undue delay” as a guarantee that “ relates not only to the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time by which it should end and judgment be rendered; all stages must take place ‘without undue delay’ .[iv] There has been a delay from the inception of the instant case to the final day the accused was discharged.
However happy the ending was for this long-drawn ordeal for the accused person after she was discharged, she had already suffered immensely in a judicial system that is suppose to protect the rights of every Sierra Leonean before it, irrespective of sex, race, ethnic or other social backgrounds. Spending more than two years behind bars for allegedly committing an offence that she was acquitted and discharged of is a facade of justice especially in a jurisdiction where compensation for acquitted persons is a myth.
Few lessons could be drawn from above story. It firstly paints a gloomy picture about our judiciary- that in spite of the efforts in its reform, it is yet to rid itself from the myriads of problems that beset it during the pre-conflict periods. Secondly, it underscores the importance of a legal representation, and hence the need for a national legal aid scheme for the provision of legal representation for indigent Sierra Leoneans like Saffie whose rights were abused with impunity by the very system that is suppose to protect it. Finally, it clearly shows the ineptitude of the police, a crucial arm – gate-keepers – of the justice system who has the primary function of investigating crimes.
[i] Communication No. 336/1988, N. Fillastre v. Bolivia (Views adopted on 5 November 1991), in UN doc.GAOR, A/47/40, p. 306, para. 6.5
[ii] Section 23 (1) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991, Article 14 (3) (C) of the ICCPR
[iii] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, CCPR/C/GC/32, para 35
[iv] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 13